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Conversational Adequacy: Mistakes are the EssenceDonald Perlisyand Khemdut PurangDepartment of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742(301) 405-2685perlis,kpurang@cs.umd.eduAbstractWe argue that meta-dialog and meta-reasoning, farfrom being of only occasional use, are the very essenceof conversation and communication between agents.We give four paradigm examples of massive use ofmeta-dialog where only limited base dialog may bepresent, and use these to bolster our claim of central-ity for meta-dialog. We further illustrate this withrelated work in active logics. We argue moreover thatthere may be a core set of meta-dialog principles thatis in some sense complete. If we are right, then imple-menting such a set would be of considerable interest.We give examples of existing computer programs thatconverse inadequately according to our guidelines.IntroductionIn (McRoy 1993) McRoy urges that the ability todeal with mistakes is central to communication, andmoreover that it is best treated as part and parcel ofthe same reasoning and linguistic abilities as the restof the communication process, rather than as a sep-arate and optional renement. We agree. In fact,much of the research in active logics (Miller 1993;Gurney, Perlis, & Purang 1995; Purang, Perlis, & Gur-ney 1996) is based on a very similar point of view, notonly toward communication but toward situated rea-soning in general.This is also related to the grounding problem (Traum1994) and the misidentication problem (Miller 1993;Maida 1991; 1992)Here we will explore the thesis that meta-dialog andmeta-reasoning are, in some sense, both necessary andsucient for communication. Just as the common-sense world has proven to be suciently complex torequire that any intelligent commonsense agent be ableto carry on appropriate meta-reasoning with respect toThis research has been supported in part by grantsfrom the National Science Foundation and the ArmyResearch Oce. We thank Betsy Klipple for helpfuldiscussion.yInstitute for Advanced Computer Studies
uncertainty, incomplete data, error and inconsistency,conversation too is fraught with complex and frequentsurprises requiring the same degree of commonsensereasoning. Mistakes are inevitable in dialog; indeed,there can be no such thing as error-free dialog even inprinciple, let along in practice: language itself has toomany ambiguities for that. In practice, conversationbreaks down almost instantly in the absence of facilityto recognize and repair errors, ask claricational ques-tions, give conrmation, and perform disambiguation.Military commands and air trac control to the con-trary: these are highly reduced lingoes. Yet even therewe nd negotiation over meaning. The closest thing toreal error-free speech may be in fact a speech, wherethe audience listens silently and probably misunder-stands a great deal. Yet even there the speaker oftenresorts to speech repairs.A good test of this claim can be gotten via a typedconversation in which there is no backspacing, no re-pair of any sort, no back reference to what was said:one is required to go on and let errors lie in peace. Tryit: you'll nd that you do not get far, even if you typevery accurately, there will be errors of thought, thingsyou decide you did not mean, but you are not allowedto correct or comment on them.Moreover, sucient facility with meta-reasoning canovercome large amounts of deciency in other matters,whether in problem-solving or in conversation. Rieger(Rieger 1974) makes a similar point; here we are con-cerned to apply this idea to the problem of miscom-munication in particular, with attention as well to theTuring Test.Related work on miscommunicationThe related work described below is concerned, in oneform or another, with detection and repair of miscom-munication. This brief review will motivate the rest ofthe paper.
T1 Mother: Do you know who's going to thatmeeting?T2 Russ: Who?T3 Mother: I don't know.T4 Russ: Oh. Probably Mrs. McOwen andprobably Mrs. Cadry and some ofthe teachers.Figure 1: Russ notices an inconsistency at T3 andmakes a repair at T4McRoy and HirstMcRoy and Hirst (McRoy 1993; Hirst & McRoy 1995)consider misunderstanding and repairs in dialog. Intheir model of conversation, misunderstanding is sig-nalled by an inconsistency between the expectationsof a dialog participant and an utterance. The agentmust then reason about and explain this inconsistency.This can lead to a change in the interpretation of pre-vious parts of the dialog and trigger a repair utterance.McRoy discusses Figure 1 where T3 is inconsistent withthe expectations of Russ and is repaired in T4.The language of the model includes terms for quotedpropositions representing the beliefs of the agent andterms for turn sequences which record the interpreta-tion of the utterances in the discourse. This enablesthe agent to reason about its beliefs, and about thediscourse, its possible interpretations and repairs.Repairs are treated as part of the core linguistic ca-pabilities of an agent and the processing of repairsis not distinguished from the processing of normalspeech.Traum and the TRAINS projectTraum (Traum 1994) observes that most approachesto natural language understanding assume that utter-ances are heard and understood correctly by the dialogparticipants. However, an appreciable portion of dialogis involved in coordinating understanding between theparticipants. This accounts for half the utterances inthe TRAINS domain (Allen & Shubert 1991).1 Theseutterances are not about the domain of the conversa-tion, but about the conversation itself, and are usedfor acknowledgement, acceptance, clarication and re-pair. An example from the TRAINS system (Heeman& Allen 1994) is:and pick up um the en- I guess the entire um p- pickup the load of oranges at Corningwhere the speaker meant:and pick up the load of oranges at Corning.1TRAINS is an ongoing project combining dialog andplanning.
T1 Agent 1: Did you hear that John broke his leg?T2 Agent 2: No really? What a shame!T3 Agent 1: Yes, and his wife now has to doeverything for him.T4 Agent 2: Wife? John isn't married. WhichJohn are you talking about?T5 Agent 1: I am talking about John Jones.T6 Agent 2: Oh, I don't know him. I thoughtyou meant John Smith.Figure 2: The meaning of \John" changes from JohnSmith to John JonesTraum discusses a nite state model for grounding(grounding is the process by which participants in a di-alog reach mutual understanding of what was intendedby the speaker) which uses a set of grounding acts in-cluding acknowledgement and repairs. These ground-ing acts are then incorporated into a theory of actionin conversation (see also (Traum & Hinkelman 1992) )which is then used in a theory of dialog managementwhich was implemented in the TRAINS system.MillerMiller (Miller 1993) discusses reasoned change in be-lief and terminological change in the context of activelogic2. An agent has to be able to change the meaningof a term and later reason about the meanings. Figure2 illustrates this.Agent 1 acquires a set of beliefs between turns T1and T3. At that point, it notices an inconsistency: T3presupposes that John is married, but agent 1 believesthat is not the case. It resolves that by challengingagent 2 at T4. Agent 2 claries the misunderstandingat T5 by pointing out that they were talking about dif-ferent Johns. This causes agent 1 to change its mean-ing of \John" from John Smith to John Jones whichresolves the inconsistency.Strategic CompetenceCanale (?) distinguishes 4 aspects of communicativecompetence: grammatical competence, sociolinguisticcompetence, discourse competence and strategic com-petence. Of these, strategic competence is most closelyrelated to our concerns.Strategic competence consists of communicationstrategies that are put to use when communicationsbreak down or when the conversational participantslack the other competences (as when one interlocutorspeaks in a language he is learning). The strategies in-voked in these cases include paraphrase, emphasis, rep-2See a later section below for a brief description of activelogic.
In a crowded New York deli a visiting Frenchman has or-dered a Swiss cheese sandwich.Waitress: What kind of bread do you want for yoursandwich, white, whole wheat or rye?Frenchman: (Wh)ye.Waitress: White?Frenchman: (Wh)ye.Waitress: White?Frenchman: Whole wheat.Figure 3: A linguistic deciency resulting in messageabandonment.etition, avoidance (including message abandonment)and clarication seeking. This is illustrated in Figure3 from (Savignon 1983) where breakdown of communi-cation leads to repetition, emphasis and nally to theabandonment of the original message.Tarone (Tarone 1981) notes that communicationstrategies go beyond those a speaker uses to expresshimself in the face of a decient language system. Theycrucially include negotiation of meaning by both in-terlocutors to ensure that they reach common under-standing in situations where they do not share meaningstructures.Presuppositions and ImplicaturesIn (Gurney, Perlis, & Purang 1995; Purang, Perlis, &Gurney 1996), the authors consider active logics ap-plied to the processing of presuppositions and of im-plicatures. The common theme of these papers is theneed for tracking over time the set of beliefs an agenthas as it participates in a dialog. Figure 4 makes thepoint for presuppositions.T2 presupposes that there are roses and that there isa fridge. At T3, though, the presupposition that thereare roses is defeated but the presupposition that thereis a fridge is unscathed. However, in the standard dis-course updating theory (Heim 1983), at the end of T3,the presupposition that there is a fridge would not bepresent. Using an active logic to process the discoursea step at a time, and to handle contradictions gives thecorrect results.Figure 5 illustrates implicatures being made andlater withdrawn.At T2, Kathy infers the implicature that the rosesare fresh, since Bill says that they are in the fridge.T1 Mary: Are the roses in the fridge?T2 John: No the roses are not in the fridge.T3 John: Because there are no roses.Figure 4: A presuppositional example.
However, at the very next moment, she needs to retractthis when Bill states that the roses are not fresh afterall. The active logic used enables contradictory beliefsto be held (e.g., that the roses are fresh and that theyare not fresh) temporarily, which serves as a trigger forsubsequent repair (e.g., settling on one of the two).This has illustrated some forms of miscommunica-tion and approaches to studying them. In the nextsubsection we discuss active logic (alluded to above)which we intend to use as a tool to formalize and ex-plore conversational adequacy.Active logicActive logic (Elgot-Drapkin & Perlis 1990; Miller &Perlis 1993) is a family of formalisms developed forthe purpose of modeling the reasoning process in a waythat respects the passage of time as reasoning proceeds.These formalisms have been applied to a number ofdomains, from multi{agent interaction to deadline{coupled planning, from fully{decidable default reason-ing to reasoning in the presence of contradictions, fromcorrecting misidentication errors to meaning change.Rather than proceeding from one nonmonotonic the-ory (with one set of axioms) to another nonmonotonictheory (with an updated set of axioms) there is onediscretely evolving theory in active logic. This modelsa process of thinking that takes a reasoner from one be-lief state to the next. The sequence of belief states thereasoner experiences is recorded into a history. Thathistory, together with a quotation mechanism enablesthe logic to reason about its own reasoning in time.The belief state transitions are eected by a set ofrules which map the history up to time t onto a newstate at t + 1. The inheritance rule, for instance, will,by default, cause all the beliefs at time t to be inheritedto time t + 1. One of the situations where this rule isdefeated is the presence of direct contradictions at timet|if both p and not(p) are beliefs at t, then neither isinherited to t+1. This in eect removes the contradic-tion from the current belief state and prevents it frominfecting future states. Such a contradiction will alsotrigger the belief contra(p; not(p)) at t+ 1 to indicatea contradiction occurred. The logic can then reasonabout the contradictands and reinstate the one judgedcorrect (if any).T1 Kathy: Are the roses fresh?T2 Bill: They are in the fridge.T3 Bill: But they are not fresh.Figure 5: The implicature triggered at T2 is absentafter T3
Conversational AdequacyHere we outline a preliminary list of items that wethink are part of an essential core of conversationaladequacy. First, we distinguish four broad categoriesof capacities: basic inference, basic learning, basic lan-guage, and miscommunication competence. The rstthree are the \basic" capacities, and the fourth is a\meta" capacity. Basic inference includes deductive,nonmonotonic, and abductive inference; basic learn-ing includes advice-taking, grouping (concept forma-tion), word learning; basic language includes syntax,semantics, and pragmatics, including aspects of con-versational analysis (Levinson 1983).We suppose an agent to have at least a weak abilityin the three basic capacities; what is critical is thatthese be sucient to support the fourth capacity: mis-communication competence.3 Thus the agent may berather poor at parsing, for example, but must be ableto parse such meta-sentences as \what does X mean?"and \can you repeat that?" and \didn't you say X?".Notice that the use of quoted or reied text, is a spe-cial ability not always included in parsers. The agentmust furthermore be able to reason appropriately onthe basis of such parses. It is helpful to think of theagent as translating parsed sentences into an internallogical language on which its inference engine can run;and among its inferential tasks is the assessment of theparse as plausible or not: if not, then a miscommuni-cation is presumed and a repair eort is initiated.Our thesis can now be stated as follows:(i) SUFFICIENCY: as long as there is at least a weakability in the \basic" capacities (inference, learning andlanguage) then eective conversation can proceed ifthere is a strong miscommunication capacity.(ii) NECESSITY: no matter how strong the basic ca-pacities, eective communication cannot proceed ifthere is not a strong miscommunication capacity.We now suggest what miscommunication compe-tence might consist of. It will be general-purpose meta-reasoning, involving at least the following ve features:1. Time: In a series of studies of commonsense rea-soning, including some aspects of dialog, we havefound, again and again, that a high degree of situ-ated temporal reasoning provides tremendous gainsin representational and inferential capacity, and in3For instance, the following would be part of suchweak abilities: modus ponens, quotation or reication, andchange of belief. These are required in particular to facili-tate the ve features below that characterize miscommuni-cation competence.
particular in the capacity to deal with error, con-tradiction, and miscommunication. This appears toresult in part from the ability to refer back in timeto what has been said (or thought) and thereby ex-amine its meaning and correctness.This item is fundamental, perhaps the most fun-damental of all, underlying even the use/mentiondistinction and appearance/reality distinction (see(Miller 1993)). Simply noticing, let alone repairing,an error of miscommunication, requires seeing it asa reied entity rather than as one's current view ofthe world. The agent must come to see it as part ofits previous view of the world; this in turn requires arobust situated temporal-reasoning facility, in whichthe present moment is constantly being moved intothe past as a new moment becomes the present.2. History: Time-representation permits there to bea history of the discourse so far, that is constantlydeveloping during the conversation. Since agents candisagree on the history, it must be possible to revisethe history, but in such a way that the fact of therevision as having taken place is also stored, alongwith the revised and un-revised versions.3. Meaning: Words have meanings, and the mean-ings are dierent from the words, making it possibleto hear a word, and therefore know it has been ut-tered, without knowing what it means. Moreover,meaning is plastic, at least partially under the con-trol of speakers, who may be asked what meaningthey have in mind. A key facility in meta-discourseis the ability to refer to a word, as opposed to itsmeaning; quotation is one device that can be used,but tone and other devices are also available.4. Contradiction: The examples in the section onrelated work can be viewed as involving contra-dictions in understanding between the two speak-ers. Indeed, three of the examples are explicitlyanalyzed by their authors in such terms. We con-sider the discovery of a direct contradiction to beone of the chief ways for detecting miscommunica-tion. Of course, the presence of a contradiction spellsproblems for a reasoning agent, and we are arguinghere that a conversational agent must very muchbe a reasoner too. See (Miller 1993; Roos 1992;Perlis 1996) for more discussion of the problem ofreasoning with inconsistent information.5. Deixis: Without the ability to point, verbally, tothis utterance and the present time, to ground a dis-cussion in here and now, confusion can hardly be setaright.
Time allows for the possibility of reasoning aboutconversational history; and for the possibility of rea-soning in the face of contradictions. The latter are im-portant as cues that miscommunication has occurred:recognition of miscommunication is the rst step in themeta-reasoning that can lead to repair. The next stepis often communication of the fact of miscommunica-tion, to enlist the help of the other agent in the repair;4at times however this is unnecessary, if the recognizercan eect the repair alone. In any event, reication of(typically) recent portions of the ongoing conversationis an essential step in the meta-reasoning of recognitionand repair. There must be something seen as needingrepair, and that something is linguistic rather than \inthe world": utterances are taken as things in them-selves, not identied with their presumed meanings, aslong as they are under inspection with respect to a mis-communication. Thus the recent past is turned into anobject. This can often recurse, as the present becomesreied into the past as well; see the McRoy exampleabove, where each agent initiates a repair (Mother atT3 and Russ at T4)|in this case, each agent does therepair alone, but the presumed reasoning involves in-ternal reications of what has just been said. A similarexample could be given in which Mother and Russ talkout loud as they do their repairs:T3Mother: You say \Who?"? That doesn't answer myquestion. You misunderstood me. I want toknow who myself, and hope you can tell me.We now illustrate our thesis with four examples.Extreme examples of conversationaladequacyEach of the following examples appears to be a caseof an individual not well understanding a conversa-tion, but nevertheless|by utilizing considerable meta-linguistic and meta-cognitive skills|being able tomake some headway and, in a very real sense, beinga conversational participant. These are speculative;that is, we are not certain they appropriately supportour claim, but we think that there is much to be gainedfrom airing them alongside it.Apprentice: An apprentice or novice privy to a con-versation between experts is often lost in a bewilder-ing array of unfamiliar terminology and inferences,mixed in with segments that are relatively clear. Bynoting unclear segments, the apprentice can ask forclarication when needed. And when the proferred4e.g. \That's not what I meant", a deictic reference.
clarication is itself not clear, this too can be noted;this may or may not lead to eventual understandingof the underlying topic, but in the process of nego-tiation over meanings, there is real communication.Child: Much like an apprentice, a child is often lostin adult conversation, yet can|via questions|seekclarication. Key to this is the child's understandingthat it does not understand, together with social-cognitive skills such as noting who is saying what.Again, as with the apprentice, new phrases can belearned, as well as new meanings for old phrases. See(Ochs 1991).Foreigner: A foreigner with no grasp of a languageis at a tremendous disadvantage. But with only amodicum of familiarity with very elementary fea-tures, conversation becomes possible (albeit slowand painful). These features are those we charac-terize as conversational adequacy, and are the same(we suspect) for the foreigner as for the child andthe apprentice. See (Gass & Varonis 1991).SLI: Persons suering from SLI (specic languageimpairment) (Stark & Tallal 1981) have consider-able diculty with ordinary spoken communication,and resort to various strategies to achieve commu-nication, such as repetition, memory, seeking helpfrom others, and heavy use of conscious analysisof utterances. There appears to be no underly-ing non-linguistic cognitive decit (although thisis controversial), and communication does occur,again slowly and with diculty. See (Pinker 1994;Fletcher & Hall 1992; Watkins & Rice 1994).Our point in these examples is not that excellencein parsing and other aspects of language are unimpor-tant frills, but that there is an almost pre-linguisticcore of capabilities, essential to any eective communi-cation, even very slow and inecient communication.In a sense this is denitional; for instance, below weconsider current Turing Test agents to be ineective,because they cannot, no matter how much time theyare allowed, come to deal with their interlocutor's con-cerns. Turing Test Redened?In (Hayes & Ford 1995) Hayes and Ford take Turing(Turing 1950) to task for his formulation of what hascome to be known as the Turing Test, arguing in par-ticular that it has harmful eects on the long-term de-velopment of articial intelligence. We suggest a re-denition of the Turing Test in light of their critique.We suspect that Turing was led to his formulation as aclever nessing of the tough problem of characterizing
intelligence; as such it does not do much toward solv-ing that problem. However, we think that a slightlymore sympathetic reading can suggest a fruitful direc-tion to take, related to what we have been presentingabove, namely that of conversational adequacy: the au-tomated agent should be able to engage in discussionincluding meta-discussion, on any topic whatsoever, asan apprentice if it knows little or nothing about it,learning as it goes. This will include the ability to talkabout the conversation itself, any miscommunicationsthat arise, and even about grammatical constructionssuch as word order, spelling, and meaning.Turing Test programsThe Loebner Prize is given each year for the programthat comes closest to passing the Turing Test, or atleast achieves the most plausible conversation. Yeteven the winners fall down dramatically in terms ofany real command of conversation. We illustrate thatwith a few of the programs available on the internet.(Note: the transcripts are in typewriter font andthe inputs to the programs are in italics. )MysteryMystery won the second prize in the 1995 competition.It is available via telnet at debra.dgbt.doc.ca on port3000.Yo. I'm here.My name is Don.I'm Joe Spansen....I'm a cleaner. I empty trash. Vacuum.Dust. You know.So you know what a vacuum is?What?You just used the word "vacuum" a momentago.I don't know.A vacuum is a device you use to vacuumdust.Huh?What is a vacuum?Beats me.How do you vacuum?What do you mean?You told me that you vacuum.What?Can you vacuum?I don't know.To vacuum is to clean with a suctiondevice.Yeah. I work real hard. No one keeps theirbuilding as clean as me. It's not fair that
they want to fire me. It's just because myboss, Mr. Johnson, is mad at me.The above exchange seems to indicate that the pro-gram is unable to reason about its own utterances orabout dialog in general. This in turn appears to makeit impossible for there to be a \meeting of minds" whenmiscommunication occurs, or indeed for there to be arecognition of miscommunication. This and most other\Turing Test" programs are very good at \running-on": they keep a supercial semblance of conversationgoing. The above continues:If you vacuum with a Hoover, he won't fireyou.Oh, they'll fire me for sure. I know whatthey're thinking. They haven't said they'regonna fire me yet because they gotta keep mearound to clean until they can find someoneelse to hire. Then they'll fire me for someother reason that won't make problems withthe union. They fire lots of cleaners.They'll just say I'm a bad cleaner. Theyfired my friend, Fred two years ago becausethey said he was a bad cleaner.Vacuum with a Hoover.Huh?A Hoover will impress Mr, Johnson so muchhe will give you a raise.Beats me.Fred wasn't fired.Yeah. He's one of the guys in our group.Just some guys from work. We hang outtogether. Do stuff. You know.You are wrong about Fred. He wasn't fired.We usually go down to the club and drinkbeer and stuff.The program is oblivious to the direct contradictionbetween what it said (Fred was red) and our rejoinderto the contrary. This is another telltale sign of conver-sational inadequacy: a meeting of minds requires aboveall the ability to notice when minds (and utterances)suer a mismatch.HexHex was the winner of the 1996 Loebner Prize compe-tition. The source code of the program is available athttp://ciips.ee.uwa.edu.au/~hutch. The following dia-log again illustrates the same failings as the Mysteryprogram above, but is more tantalizing because it has amuch more convincing uidity, and more careful prob-ing is required to reveal the underlying lack of con-versational adequacy. We struggled repeatedly and invarious formats and phrasings to get the program torefer to its own past utterances or indeed to our ut-
terances, with no success. Nor was it able to refer towords, as opposed to their referents. Thus no repairs,nor even recognition of miscommunication was possi-ble.G'day mate.Hi, I'm Don Smith.Hello. Now, that's the formalities over!Not over yet. Did yo forget to tell meyour name?My name is Jason, but you can call me Jasif you like...Did you forget to tell me your name atfirst?I have already told you! My name is JASON.Yes, I know you told me already. Butbefore you told me your name, you first said"that's the formalities over" --do youremember?OK. That's good... My name is Jason, butyou can call me Jas if you like...I am curious about your sense of time. Whostated his name first as our conversationbegan, you or me?If you are curious about my sense of time,it's your business, mate! I have alreadytold you! My name is JASON.You told me your name and I told you mine.But who told his name FIRST?Why do you feel that you have to tell methat I told you my name and you told Iyours? Well, I could tell you who told hisname first, but you'd never believe me ;^oWould you like to hear a joke? Knock,knock...No, wait, please, I am confused, let's notdo the joke yet. I need to get clear abouthow we are remembering time. For instance,the last thing I said to you before youstarted the joke, was "who told his namefirst?" Do you remember that?Confusing! I'll show you confusing! Ytusmf eptl piy ejsy O s, dsuomh! OK, here's ajoke for you. Knock, knock.I'm afraid I can't take a joke right now.Please do not go on with a joke. Tell meinstead why you did not tell me your name atfirst.Alright! Cool. Knock, knock. I refuse totell you about anything! I dislike yourcompany. I don't know what your motivesare, but you certainly aren't treating mewith respect!I am trying to find out if you and I have
similar ways of reasoning aboutconversations.Wow - you are trying to find out if I andyou have similar ways of reasoning aboutconversations? Me too! Which part of thecountry are you from?No, I think we are not understanding oneanother. Do you know what a converstationis?I wonder whether you think sometimes! I amfeeling like the judge here!Do you know the word "conversation"?Sorry, but I don't wish to reveal whether Iknow the word "conversation". It is kind ofpersonal.You do know the word "personal" then. Youjust used it. Yes?Perhaps I do know the word "personal" then,but it's hardly any of your business... Ifind it rather insulting that you think Ijust used it! I'm glad to know that that'sthe case.I am confused again. Didn't you say "It iskind of personal" a minute ago?I didn't want to know that you are confusedagain, thanks... Maybe I did not say "it iskind of personal" a minute ago. I'll nevertell. Hehehe ;^)What will you never tell?Well, I know what I will never tell, but Irefuse to tell you! So, have you evervisited Australia?This is a change of topic. We begantalking about names, and then I forget, whatelse did we talk about? Was it the weather?Perhaps a change of topic is, perhaps not.It's a mystery ;^) We are bloody welltalking, aren't we? We have such niceweather all year round back home. I'm notreally used to really cold temperatures.I remember: we talked about names and thenabout words such as "personal"and"conversation". Do yu remember that?I always suspected that you remember: wetalked about names and then about words suchas "personal" and "conversation". Now Iknow for sure ;^) Look - it doesn't matterif yu remember that. Change the topic! So,what do you do for a living?You misspelled the word "for" when youtyped "dor" just now.Hey! I don't criticize you, do I? Whatdoes one measly mistake mean, anyway?
Can you tell me what "do dor a lliving"means?I have absolutely no idea what "do dor alliving" means.can you tell me what "do for a living"means?I'm sure someone out there knows what "dofor a living" means...What does "someone out there" mean?Do *you* know what "someone out there" meandoes? I'm unsure myself.What does "unsure" mean?I really can't say what "unsure" mean does.Can you give me more info? What do youthink of this Loebner contest thing?can you tell me what "contest" means?I don't know... sorry...Can you tell me what "sorry" means?That's really outside the range of myexpertise. Have you seen any good filmslately?can you tell me what a film is?I do like to go to the movies, but I can'tstand most of the Hollywood trash. Iactually prefer international cinema. Whathave you seen recently?I am a foreigner, I have troubleunderstanding, please tell me what a filmis.I saw "The City of Lost Children" recently.Have you heard of it?What does "City" mean?Hmmm... I really couldn't say. On anothernote - have you seen any good moviesrecently?What does "movie" mean?If I knew I'd tell you, but I don't so Iwon't ;^)But you just said "movie"!Hehehe. Trying to trick me, eh?No, I just want to find out if you and Ideal with time similarly.Did you say "haveyou seen any good movies recently" a momentago?Oh well, that's a pity! Aw shucks!Do you know a difference between a movieand the word "movie"?Hey, I don't know!!! Maybe I know adifference between a movie and the word"movie", but who cares???Did you type "wordd"?Most people believe I did type "wordd" -what do you say to that?
Did you type "peole"?Perhaps I did type "peole", don't ask me!How should I know? What kind of music areyou into?We have similar examples using various other recentLoebner Prize competitors, and we are condent thatconversational inadequacy as we have described it ear-lier in this paper is not present even in rudimentaryform in any of these programs.Toward programs that converse!There is such a thing as talking past one another, whereI talk for a bit, then you talk for a bit, with only veryslight attention to the details of what the other is say-ing. This talking-past, or running-on, is typical of Tur-ing Test eorts as seen above; programs are assessedwith respect to how well they can chatter on in roughcorrespondence to a topic, with appropriate defuserssuch as \I don't know" or \huh?" when the syntaxgets too tough. But there is little or no communica-tion, in the sense of success at dealing with the specicpoints being made by the other speaker. In particular,clarication questions such as \Are we talking aboutthe same person?" are generally not dealt with at all.In general, meaning is not dealt with at all, and inparticular not situated meaning (e.g., reference to thedialog itself). Some programs are quite cleverly de-signed to appear to be engaging in \real" dialog, i.e.,engaged in discussion of a topic in concert with theirinterlocutor; but no amount of eort to get them todeal with meaning succeeds, and this reveals that theyare in eect babbling words meaningless to them.Here we give an example of the sort of \real" dis-cussion that reveals attention to meaning (and henceto errors: error after all is a mismatch between whatis meant or intended and what was produced, i.e., themeaning produced is not the meaning desired).We imagine a \bare" human: stripped of all personaland episodic memory and even perhaps of much vocab-ulary, but with rationality and error-dealing capacityintact, as well as some bare-bones language.you: How old are you?AL: I don't know what \old" means.you: \Old" refers to the number of years you have beenalive.AL: I don't know what \years" and \alive" mean.you: OK. Let's start with time. Do you know about time?AL: \About time" means \almost too late".
you: You misunderstand me. I mean, do you know what\time" means?AL: Yes: \time" is the measure that keeps increasingsecond by second.you: Good. Now, how much time has passed since youwere born?AL: What is \born"?you: Let's back up. A minute is 60 seconds; an hour is 60minutes; a day is 24 hours; and a year is 365 days.AL: OK.you: So, how many years have you been here, or any-where?AL: I can't calculate that; I don't know where to countfrom.you: Do you remember ever not being here?AL: No.you: How long have we been talking?AL: 22 seconds; now 23; now 24...you: Stop! That's enough.AL: What is enough?you: What do you mean?AL: You said \that's enough." What does \that" referto?you: Oh, \that's enough" is just an expression, meaning\stop".AL: OK. So you repeated yourself: you said \stop" andthen said \that's enough" as well.you: Hmm, you are right. I guess there is more meaningto \that's enough" than simply \stop" but I can'texplain it easily.AL: OK.you: What is your name?AL: I don't know.you: Let's call you \AL".AL: OK, my name will be \AL".you: So, AL, what is the earliest memory you have?AL : Hmm, I think it is when we began talking, abouta minute ago.
. . .Although AL and the interlocutor have not gottenvery far, and have not answered the opening question,nevertheless each utterance in the sequence does byand large bear on what has gone before, especiallywhen either party calls the others' attention to that.This dialog illustrates at least four of our ve miscom-munication competence features. In addition the twoagents have made some signicant progress in reachingsome common ground and in particular in referring tothe course of the conversation itself.The above conversation is not a human/computerdialog. However, it should be! There seems to bea no-man's land between academic NLP and Loeb-ner Prize NLP. Each extreme seems far removed from\genuine" conversation of the sort we are urging here.We think that substantial eort devoted to algorithmictreatments of conversational adequacy may help bridgethe gap between theoretically informed single-sentenceresearch and totally unbridled (as well as unprincipled)Turing Test programs.ConclusionsWe do not believe that our preliminary list of princi-ples for conversational adequacy is, in itself, adequate!We are sure that further essential principles can beadded, without which eective communication cannotoccur. But we think that a complete list may be possi-ble, and that, like a universal Turing machine, a certaindegree of capability opens the door to the rest (moduloeciency). Since we are not working within the stric-ture of a precise denition of eective communication,proofs are not possible; but for the same reason proofsof the Church-Turing Thesis are not possible. Insteadwe can hope for suggestive evidence, such as in theform of computer programs with more or less conver-sational ability, and in the form of human examplessuch as we have presented.Our suggested conversational adequacy principlesare largely ones of cognitive ability, not specic to con-versation. We think this is appropriate: much of thereasoning that underlies eective communication, andespecially eective dealing with miscommunication, isgeneral-purpose reasoning. For this reason, Turing wasappealing to a good hunch in focusing on conversationas a measure of thought. While thought of course canoccur without conversation, it is less plausible that (ef-fective) conversation can occur without thought; this ismost salient in the conversational patterns associatedwith (repair of) miscommunication.
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uenced the course of the dialog. These errors are afeature of the program, to make its typing seem morehuman. We responded to some of them, calling atten-tion to them, and the program's responses pretty muchignored our e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